





















Introduction: The Rejuvenation 
of Industrial Policy 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Justin Yifu Lin and Celestin Monga 
Knowledge validation has never been a painless process. lt often takes a 
major, disastrous historical event for even the most self-evident ideas to gain 
wide recognition. lt is therefore not surprising that the Great Recession of 
2008-09 - whose global economic and social cost is still yet to be quantified -
has led to a rethinking of many aspects of what might be thought of as the 
ronventional wisdom in economics. 
1his book is about one important area in which there has been a major 
rethinking - industrial policy, by which we mean government policies 
directed at affecting the economic structure of the economy. The standard 
argument was that markets were efficient1 so there was no need for govern-
ment to intervene either in the sectoral allocation of resources or in the 
choices of technique. And even if markets were not efficient, governments 
were not likely to improve matters. But the crisis showed that markets were 
not necessarily efficient, and indeed, there was a broad consensus that with-
out strong government intervention -which included providing life-lines to 
. certain !inns and certain industries - the market economies in the USA and 
!. Europe may have collapsed. 
. Today, the relevance and pertinence of industrial policies are acknowl-
·;ectged by mainstream economists and political leaders from ail sides of the 
',ideological spectrum. 
';::<In the United States, President Barack Obama was not shy in saying, in his 
· 013 State of the Union address, that his "first priority is making America 
'J1lagnet for new jobs and manufacturing." After funding the creation of 
anufacturing innovation institute in Youngstown1 Ohio, he announced 
'~:launch of 11manufacturing hubs/1 where businesses will partner with the 
artments of Defense and Energy to turn regions left behind by globaliza-
!nto global centers of high-tech jobs, and he asked Congress to "help 
ea network of fifteen of these hubs and guarantee that the next revolu-
in manufacturing is Made in America. "1 
· the United Kingdom, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron 
tsed "to have a proper industrial strategy to get behind the growth 
1 
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engines of the future." 2 Observing that "market forces are insufficient for 
creating the long term industrial capacities we need," his government 
vowed "to identify British success stories as identified through success in 
trade and explicitly get behind them at the highest political level" (Cable, 
2012). These would be "areas where we need a more strategic and proactive 
approach using all of the government's policy levers - rather than simply 
responding to crises after they have developed, or waiting to see what the 
market dictates." In Japan, the conservative Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
recently created a new governance body for microeconomic policy, the 
Economic Revitalization Headquarters, which includes an indust1ial com-
petitiveness council whose purpose is to formulate growth strategies. 
In the European Union (EU), where the global crisis may have done 
the most profound long-term economic and social damage, almost all 
governments are reassessing their industrial strategies, trying to learn from 
successful experiences of Finland or Germany. Within the EU, where the 
idea of industrial policy has long been rooted, the thinking has evolved 
significantly. Departing from its stated commitment "to the horizontal 
nature of industrial policy and to avoid a return to selective interventionist 
policies" (EC 2005), the EU Commission has now adopted "a fresh approach 
to industrial policy" aiming at "bringing together a horizontal basis and 
sectoral application [that] will consider appropriate measures to inform 
consumers and promote industrial excellence in given sector." Specific sec-
tors are identified for support (motor vehicles and transport equipment 
industries, energy supply industries, chemicals, agro-food, and so on) and 
sector-specific initiatives recommended to promote them (EC 2010, pp. 4 
and 23). An entire department at the EU Commission is currently devoting 
much financial and human resources to design and help implement indus-
trial policies across the Eurozone. 
ln emerging economies such as China, Russia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
or Nigeria, where the largest fraction of the world's poor reside, policymak-
ers are also eager to encourage new thinking on the various ways in which 
smart industrial policy can help sustain growth and open up new possi-
bilities for employment creation. Dani Rodrik has aptly summed up the sea 
change of attitude in relation to industrial policy by pointing out the appar-
ent irony of the firm McKinsey, the global symbol of managerial capitalism, 
advising governments all over the world on how to do it right (Rodrik, 2012 
and Rodrik and McMillan, 2011). 
Clearly, there is a new impetus for industrial policy, and the general 
recognition - even among mainstream economists - that it often involves 
good common-sense economic policy. 
But what exactly is industrial policy? Why has it raised so much contro-
versy and confusion? What is the compelling new rationale for it1 which 
seems to bring mainstream economists to acknowledge its crucial impor-
tance and revisit some of the fundamental assumptions of economic theory 
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and economic development? How can it be designed to avoid the pitfalls 
of some of the seeming past failures and to emulate some of the past suc-
cesses? What are the contours of the emerging consensus and remaining 
issues and open questions? The collection of papers presented in this vol-
ume and initially discussed at a roundtable3 try to provide answers to these 
burning questions. This book is a contribution in the large body of ongoing 
analytical work that focuses on the rejuvenation of industrial policy in the 
post-crisis global economy,' discusses the evolving conceptions of industrial 
policy, takes. stock of intellectual progress, documents the challenges of 
implementation, and outlines the remaining intellectual and policy agenda. 
A short biography of an idea 
The famous, late Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe often complained that 
many of the great literary critics who like his work do so "for the wrong 
reasons, n which made him feel uncomfortable even among his strongest 
supporters. Industrial policy5 can be said to be in the same situation: it has 
too often been celebrated and advocated for the wrong reasons. 
The 1960s and 1970s were marked by interventionist government policies 
to promote economic nationalism and development in many of the devel-
oping countries. lt was evident that the market economy- so far as it existed 
under colonialism - had not resulted in development. There were many 
motivations for the establishment of state-owned firms: a shortage of pri-
vate entrepreneurs, the lack of depth of local (private) capital and financial 
markets able and willing to finance new enterprises or the expansion of old 
ones, the inability of local enterprises to bear the risks of large-scale invest-
ment, a fear of exploitation by foreign firms - typically from the colonizing 
countries that had previously exploited them so badly, and intellectual cur-
rents fashionable at the time (understandable in the aftermath of the Great 
J)epression) that emphasized the limitations of markets. Interestingly, it was 
in the same period that economic theory came to better understand "market 
·· failures," the many instances in which profit-maximizing firms do not lead 
to economic efficiency or societal well-being. 
·· .. It was hoped that these state-owned firms would be profitable; would rein-
xest their proceeds - thus closing the resource gap that separated developed 
from developing countries; and would also narrow the technological gap 
with advanced economies. 
The record of the early industrial policies is mixed. While some countries 
ere able to record high growth rates, mostly in Latin America (Ocampo 
d Ros, 2011), the results of these early-generation industrial policies were 
.. \en disappointlng: instead of converging to the developed countries' 
.come levels, many developing countries where industrial policies were 
plemented stagnated or even recorded a deterioration of their income gap 
jth developed countries. While industrial policies were often blamed for 
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these disappointing outcomes, failures in macroeconomic policies and gov-
ernance often played a role-and were often the real source of the problem. 
But critics of the industrial policies implemented in many of the coun-
tries argued that they had introduced profound distortions: limited public 
resources were used to pursue unsustainable import-substitution policies. 
To reduce the burden of public subsidies, governments sometimes resorted 
to administrative measures - granting the non-viable enterprises in prior-
itized industries a market monopoly, suppressing interest rates, overvaluing 
domestic currency and controlling prices for raw materials. Such interven-
tions themselves introduced further distortions, sometimes even causing 
shortages in foreign exchange and raw materials. Preferential access to credit 
deprived others of resources meaning that there was a high opportunity cost 
(Lin and Monga, 2013). 
In the 1980s, with the rise of market fundamentaiism (with President 
Ronald Reagan in the USA and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 
UK, and with international financial institutions reflecting the prevalent 
ideologies), the pendulum shifted from market failures to government failures: 
with the rise of the rational expectations in economics, the faith in the 
rationality of agents operating in free markets became the new intellectual 
gospel for development economics. It became fashionable to dismiss any 
proactive attempt by the government to foster structural transformation, and 
attribute economic success only to liberalization, privatization, and deregula-
tion. Industrial policy took a backseat to Washington Consensus policies. 
Even in the pe1iod of the ascendency of the Washington Consensus, this 
orthodoxy was being questioned by both academics and policymakers. In 
East Asia, there was historically unprecedented growth. They had active 
industrial policies - though they did many other things well in addition. 
Just as there has been controversy concerning to what extent it was sensible 
to ascribe disappointing results in some countries to industrial policiesi so 
too there was in relation to the successes. But what was clear was that these 
countries did not subscribe to the doctrines of the Washington Consensus 
(World Bank, 1993; Stiglitz, 1996). 
At the same time, in some developed countries, like the United States, 
there was growing recognition of the role that industrial policies - especially 
in the form of the promotion of new technologies - had played in their 
success. 
The successes in East Asia were inevitably contrasted with the failures in 
the rest of the developing world, where Washington Consensus policies 
often dominated. Sub-Saharan Africa saw not only a decline in per capita 
income, but also a process of deindustrialization (Noman and Stiglitz, 2012). 
Simultaneously, academic research was highlighting a deeper set of mar-
ket failures. The presumption that markets were efficient was reversed, 
when it was shown that whenever there was imperfect and asymmetric 
information, and/or imperfect risk markets, the market equilibrium was not 
efficient (Greenwald 
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efficient (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). These new theories helped explain 
the problems that developing countries had in capital and financial markets 
and in entrepreneurship. 
Equally important, it was recognized that what separated developed from 
developing countries was a gap in knowledge (World Bank, 1998), and 
that markets for the production and transfer of knowledge were inherently 
imperfect, 
Many years earlier, Solow (1957) had shown that most increases in standard 
of living are related to the acquisition of knowledge, to "learning." It followed 
that understanding how economies best learn - how economies can best 
be organized to increase the production and dissemination of productivity-
enhancing knowledge - should be a central part of the study of development 
and growth. But markets on their own fail to 11maximize11 learning. They 
ignore important knowledge spillovers. Sectors where knowledge is important 
tend to be imperfectly competitive, with the result that output is restrained. 
In fact, the production of knowledge is often a joint product with the pro-
duction of goods, which means that the production of goods themselves will 
not in general be (intertemporally) efficient. Yet, surprisingly, development 
economists had typically not focused on this issue, nor on the implications 
for the desirability of government intervention. 
The 2008-09 global crisis painfully forced many economists and policy-
makers to face reality: they had to acknowledge that the issues of market fail-
ures are pervasive, even in high-income countries with fairly well-developed 
financial markets. 
Some of the most important national and global policy objectives (equal-
ity of opportunity for all citizens, pollution control, climate change, and so 
on) are simply often not reflected in market prices. The successful experi-
ences of countries that did not foJlow the dominant Washington Consensus 
policy framework and their importance as new global players on the inter-
national economic scene (from China to Brazil) make the rethinking of 
macroeconomic strategies and industrial policy unavoidable. 
There is another reason for a renewed focus on industrial policy: it has 
become obvious that all governments are engaged in various forms of 
industrial policies - even those that advocate horizontal or 11 neutral 11 poli-
cies end up taking actions that favor certaln industries more than others 
and therefore shape the sectoral allocation of the economy. In all coun-
tries, some industries, sectors, and even firms are favored within the legal 
framework and heavily subsidized, often in non-transparent ways. A case in 
point is that of the banking sector in the United States: the Federal Reserve 
(a branch of the government) lends money to banks at a 1 percent interest 
rate, which is then used by these banks to buy Treasury bills (from the same 
government) at, say, 4 percent (that represents about $30 billion in subsi-
dies a year, more than any developing country governments will ever grant 
to one industry). Bankruptcy laws that put derivatives first in line in the 
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event of bankruptcy effectively give preference to the financial sector. Most 
countries' tax codes are riddled with tax expenditures that provide hidden 
subsidies to particular industries. But even in the absence of such 11special 11 
provisions, the design of depreciation allowances will affect industries with 
different capital lifespans differently. Budget policies also inevitably have 
impacts on industrial structure: where governments locate roads and ports 
affects different industries and firms differently. In short, one cannot escape 
thinking about the differential impacts of different policies on different 
sectors. 
Even economists who oppose sectoral industrial policy (the so-called 
"vertical" policies to support specific industries) acknowledge the need for 
broad, neutral, "horizontal" industrial policy (one that does not target spe-
cific industries). Yet the lines between the two could be blurry. Everything 
governments do or choose not to do benefits or can be captured by vested 
interests. A particular exchange rate policy could be presented as 11neutral11 
and "broad-based. 11 Yet1 we know that some sectors, industries, .social groups, 
and even regions are always favored or penalized by any stance on exchange 
rates. Even when there is no change, some benefit while others lose out. 
Likewise, infrastructure development is often presented as a suitable tool of 
economic policy because of its perceived "neutrality. 11 Yet there is nothing 
neutral about the choice of infrastructure that a country needs at any given 
time, or where and when it should be built. These decisions always involve 
some political judgment about priorities, and therefore represent industrial 
policies. The same is true for education, which is often mistakenly presented 
as "neutral. 11 
Therefore, the question is not whether any government should use 
industrial policy but rather how to use industrial policy in the best way. 
True, industrial policy still carries a somewhat blemished reputation in 
mainstream economics and still generates controversy. However, things 
have changed considerably in the aftermath of the Great Recession: it is no 
longer associated systematically with loss-making nationalized industries. 
This is reflected in the public discourse of political leaders from advanced 
and developing countries alike, liberal and conservative. Even the import-
substitution policies of Latin America have been re-examined in this new 
light - and appear to have been far more successful, on average, than critics 
alleged (Ocampo and Ros, 2011). Even when they imposed budgetary costs, 
there may have been society wide benefits; and even if these budgetary 
costs had adverse effects, the lesson may not be to abandon such policies, 
but to redesign them in ways that preserve as much of, say, the learning 
benefits as possible, without the financial burden that has been associated 
with them. 
But just like the excited Chirma Achebe critics who celebrate his work 
for the wrong reasons1 the wrong justific_ations are still often being made 
to support industrial policy. The profound changes in the distribution of 
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power in the world economy (the rise of large middle-income economies 
such as China, Brazil, India, or Indonesia) and the fear of globalization 
(increased competition from emerging economies even in high-technology 
goods, deindustrialization, migration of workers) are still being offered in 
advanced countries to justify the granting of financial aid and protection to 
some industries for "strategic or national security" purposes. Similar argu-
ments are also made in low-income countries to advocate inward-looking 
policies that are unsustainable. It is therefore useful to briefly take stock of 
intellectual progress on industrial policy, and highlight some of the lessons 
that the global crisis has brought to the debate. 
Emerging consensus and remaining challenges 
On the conceptual front, the justification for industrial policy has always 
been well grounded in economic theory, in particular in the theories of 
market failure alluded to earlier. In the development context, there are a few 
aspects of these "failures" that are particularly salient. 
Modem economic growth is a process of continuous technological inno-
vation, industrial upgrading and economic diversification. No country in 
the world has been able to move from low- to middle- and high-income 
status without undergoing the process of industrialization. Structural 
transformation is always taking place because of changes in technology, 
in comparative advantage, and in the global economy. There is a need for 
some guiding principles on how 11best'1 any society should move its human, 
capital, and financial resources from low- to high-productivity sectors. For 
the process to be efficient, coordination issues and externalities issues must 
be addressed. On their own markets typically do not manage such structural 
transformations well. 
Moreover, as we noted earlier, most increases in per capita income arise 
from advances in technology - about 70 percent of growth comes from 
'<·_:,Sources other than factor accumulation. In developing countries, a sub-
. 1tantial part of the growth in developing countries arises from closing the 
"knowledge" gap between themselves and those at the frontier. Within 
)l.PY country, there is enormous scope for productivity improvement 
·simply by closing the gap between best practices and average practices. If 
improvements in standards of living come mainly from the diffusion of 
i,nowledge, learning strategies must be at the heart of the development 
;strategies . 
·· These elements of a new intellectual consensus provide further justifica-
n for industrial policy- well beyond the traditional theoretical discussion 
market failures based on coordination and conventional externalities. 
s new theoretical perspective focuses on the reasons that markets, by 
emselves, are not likely to produce sufficient growth-enhancing invest-
;ents1 such as those associated with learning, knowledge accwnulation, 
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and research. Yet the issues of diffusion of learning throughout society 
to equip and empower all private agents have received little attention, in 
marked contrast to those of resource aliocation. Indeed, much of the focus 
has been on narrow conceptions of industrial policy and its suspicious con-
notation of "picking winners 11 and generating private rents without social 
rewards. 
Externalities in learning and discovery support an infant economy argu-
ment for government intervention that Greenwald and Stiglitz (this volume) 
argue is far more robust than the conventional infant industry argument. 
The consensus among economists and policymakers has grown wider on 
the need for governments to focus on issues of learning, of infant industries 
and economies, of promoting exports and the private sector, not only in 
manufacturing but also in agriculture and in services like health, informa-
tion technology, or finance. Industrial policy is therefore not just about 
manufacturing. As President Obama argued, "[E]very dollar we invested to 
map the human genome returned $140 to our economy. Today, our scien-
tists are mapping the human brain to unlock the answers to Alzheimer's; 
developing drugs to regenerate damaged organs; devising new material to 
make batteries ten times more powerful. Now is not the time to gut these 
job-creating investments in science and innovation. Now is the time to 
reach a level of research and development not seen since the height of the 
Space Race. And today1 no area holds more promise than our investments 
in American energy. 116 
The production of knowledge is different from the production of ordinary 
goods. Arrow (1962b), for instance, highlighted the non-rivalrous nature of 
knowledge and the associated disclosure problem, which makes the inno-
vative projects that ignite and sustain technological developments quite 
different from traditional capital investments. The information problems 
surrounding projects that require research and development (R&D) make 
them difficult to finance: if one discloses enough information to a potential 
investor about an idea that one would like to develop to make him willing 
to finance it1 he can often 11 steal 11 the idea. 
True, inventors can try to limit these problems by requiring potential buy-
ers to sign confidentiality agreements. However, these documents frequently 
prove to be difficult to enforce and ultimately ineffective. As a result, firms 
with the kind of promising projects that spur growth and economic devel-
opment may be unable to pursue them for a lack of resources. 
While industrial policies that promote the structural transformation of the 
economy and help create a learning economy are two of the central objectives 
of modern economic development, industiial policies may be used to pursue 
a number of other social objectives, especialiy in developing countries. 
Industrial policy has, for instance, been used to correct not only market 
failures but also government failures. In some countries and contrary to pop-
ular belief, state enterprises have been islands of relatively good governance, 
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even when the economy suffered from massive government failure. A case 
in point discussed in this book is Brazil's Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Economico e Social (BNDES, development bank), which has resisted political 
pressures rather well through decades of poor political governance. It is cred-
ited with having helped a substantial number of industries to take off. 
Other new economic functions of industrial policy include addressing 
distributional issues effectively and promoting employment. Despite a wide 
convergence of views on these new theoretical underpinnings of indus~ 
trial policy, there are still some important issues up for debate - especially 
regarding the scope, instruments, and implementation challenges in the 
often weak institutional context of developing countries. The competencies 
of government should affect the choice of instruments, and perhaps the 
"ambition" of industrial policy. Limited competencies suggest that broad-
based measures - like those associated with maintaining an undervalued 
exchange rate - may be preferable to more targeted measures. The articles in 
this book hopefully will shed light on such questions as: If industrial policy 
is inevitable anyway, what should be done differently to avoid past mis-
takes? What institutional context is needed to mitigate the risks of state cap-
ture and rent-seeking? ls there a fine line between state capture versus most 
types of public-private partnerships? What is the optimal way of designing 
and implementing industrial policy the context of fragile/unstable states 
where there are pervasive governance/rent-seeking problems? 
The new thinking about industrial policy has important implications for 
international agreements. The World Trade Organization attempts to cir-
cumscribe subsidies and trade practices that are deemed "unfair." But what 
is the appropriate restraint on state-business relations within countries, 
especially developing countries that are striving to catch up with the more 
advanced? Are these trade agreements effectively "kicking away the lad-
der" upon which the advanced industrial countries themselves climbed, as 
Chang (2002) has suggested? 
The papers in this volume debate these questions, identifying some basic 
· · principles that successful industrial policy arrangements have in common, 
·but aiso highlighting the difficulties of moving from theory to practice. 
Contents of this volume 
The papers presented in this volume are organized into four sections. The 
l!rst one deals with conceptual issues and principles of industrial policy. In 
~Comparative Advantage: The Silver Bullet of Industriai Policy,'' Lin and 
jY!ortga identify the conditions under which industrial policy - and, more 
· adly, government interventions in the economy - are likely to fail or 
cceed. They argue that industriai policy has often failed because of the 
ategic mistake of setting goals inconsistent with the level of development 
the country and the structure of its endowments at a given time. Deriving 
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lessons from the experience of unrealistic development goals, they recom-
mend that economic strategies be consistent with comparative advantage 
determined by the existing endowment structure. Such industrial policies 
set the stage for continuous growth, shared prosperity, and social cohesion. 
Greenwald and Stiglitz, in "Industrial Policies, the Creation of a Learning 
Society, and Economic Development, /1 note that market forces do not exist 
in a vacuum. Development economics routinely emphasizes the study of 
institutions as being central to growth. All the rules and regulations, the 
legal frameworks and how they are enforced, affect the structure of the 
economy, meaning that government is always, albeit often unwittingly, 
engaged in industrial policy. They are concerned with one particular reason 
for industrial policies - helping create a "learning society, 11 one which vvill 
be marked by higher rates of technological progress and lower disparities 
between best and average practices. Markets, on their own, are not efficient 
in the production and dissemination of knowledge (learning). Sectors in 
which learning (research) is important are typically characterized by a wide 
variety of market failures. Most importantly, knowledge is different from 
conventional goods; it Is, in a sense, a public good - the marginal cost of 
another person or finn enjoying the benefit of knowledge (beyond the cost 
of transmission) is zeroi usage is non-rivalrous. Markets are not efficient in 
the production and distribution of public goods. It is inevitable that there 
be, or that there ought to be, a role for government. ln a world with mobile 
factors, they suggest that a major determinant of a country's development 
strategy - of its long-term dynamic comparative advantage - is its learning 
capabilities. By paying careful attention to learning spillovers and the extent 
to which productivity is affected by production (that is, the extent to which 
there is learning-by-doing), Greenwald and Stiglitz are able to derive precise 
prescriptions for the design of industrial policies. 
The second section discusses some of the special issues that develop-
ing countries face when designing and implementing industrial policy. In 
"Technology Policies and Learning with Imperfect Governance, /1 Khan starts 
from the observation that developing countries can grow rapidly by absorb-
ing known technologies from more advanced countries. Yet these countries 
often find it difficult to absorb even relatively simple technologies even 
when they have the resources to buy the relevant machines and have work-
ers with the appropriate levels of formal education who are willing to work 
for relatively low wages. The reasons, he contends, are often contracting 
problems that impede critical investments being made. He argues that is it 
therefore important to identify the precise contracting failures that are most 
important to address and to design policies that have the greatest chance of 
being implemented given existing governance capabilities and the feasible 
improvements in these capabilities. The fit between problems, policies, and 
capabilities can explain why some countries or sectors can do well even 
when overall governance capabilities are weak. 
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In the next chapter, "The Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Industrial Policy 
and Entrepreneurship,'1 Lerner assesses the long-run consequences of public 
policies that facilitate or hinder the development of a venture capital sector, 
a sector which can be vital for establishing innovative entrepreneurship. He 
notes that in many cases, there is likely to be a role for the government in 
stimulating a vibrant entrepreneurial sector, given the early stage of matu-
rity of these activities in most nations. But at the same time
1 
it is easy for 
the government to overstep its bounds and squander its investments in this 
arena. He concludes that only by designing a program that reflects an under-
standing of the entrepreneurial process can government efforts be effective. 
The third section of the book is devoted to the instruments of industrial 
policy. In "Financing Development: The Case of BNDES," Ferraz, Coelho 
Leal, Silveira Marques, and Trinidade Miterhof analyze the multiple roles 
played by Brazil's development bank, as well as its recent participation in the 
federal government's anti-cyclical efforts to ward off the detrimental effects 
of the international financial crisis on the economic growth of the country. 
They show how the institution has managed, often quite successfully, to 
establish and employ a wide array of instruments to contend with a variety 
of challenges in Brazilian development. 
In "Growth and the Quality of Foreign Direct Investment," Alfaro and 
Charlton directly address the ability of countries to correctly identify 
attractive industrial policy targets and then tests whether the outcomes are 
superior when governments intervene. They assess the possibility that the 
effects of foreign direct investment (FDJ) on growth differ by sector. They 
also differentiate FD! based on objective qualitative industry characteristics, 
including the average skill intensity and reliance on external capital. Using 
a new dataset on industry-level and a two-stage least squares methodology 
to control for measurement error and endogeneity, they find that the effects 
of FD! on growth are more pronounced when the quality of FD! is taken 
into account. 
Monga's paper on "Theories of Agglomeration: A Critical Analysis from 
< the Policy Perspective" re-examines the notion that the concentration of 
. production in a particular geographic area brings major external benefits 
for firms in that location through knowledge spillovers, labor pooling, and 
>!he close proximity of specialized suppliers - a notion that has long been 
enshrined in economic theory. Monga notes that the eruption of new clus-
ters in the most unlikely places in countries like China does not just occur 
randomly (as suggested by some devotees of cluster analysis) but is the 
t~sult of strong and deliberate government action. His paper explains why 
standard theories of agglomeration can be misleading and why many 
mpts at building industrial clusters have not delivered the expected 
comes. It highlights the key issues to be addressed by policymakers and 
yides a framework for proactively building competitive clusters in a way 
t defies traditional prescriptions. 
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The final section of this volume presents a few regional and country case 
studies of successful and unsuccessful industrial policies. Following Monga's 
contribution from the previous section1 Zhang's paper on "Clusters as an 
Instrument for Industrial Policy: The Case of China" discusses how entre-
preneurs in a large emerging economy organize themselves to overcome 
constraints on industrial production. Clustering reduces reliance on exter-
nal finances because a finer division of labor allows each business to work 
on a smaller portion of the production process with a corresponding lower 
starting capital. Easy access to trade credit from customers and suppliers 
also alleviates working capital constralnts. Moreover, the nature of repeated 
transactions in a narrowly defined region creates pressures for entrepreneurs 
to restrain opportunistic behavior, making it easier for small business to 
thrive in an environment with imperfect external institutions. Local govern-
ments can play an instrumental role in facilitating cluster development by 
providing the necessary public goods and by coordinating collective actions. 
In "Capability Failure and Industrial Policy to Move beyond the Middle-
lncome Trap: From Trade-based to Technology-based Specialization," Lee 
argues that capability failures (rather than market failures) are the most 
serious justification for industrial policy in developing countries, and the 
source of the middle-income trap. He suggests a three-stage implementation 
strategy to build technological capabilities: first, the assimilation of foreign 
technology (operational skills and production technology) and know-how 
through licensing, FD!, or technology transfer from public research agencies; 
second, learning via co-development contracts and public-private consortia 
once the latecomer firms establish their own in-house R&D labs as a physical 
basis for more indigenous learning; and third, the leapfrogging to emerging 
technologies which involve public-private R&D cons01tia and/or exclusive 
standard policy, procurement, and user subsidies for initial market provision. 
The evolution of industrial policy in Korea is discussed in "The Chaebol 
and Industrial Policy in Korea" by Lim. Although the degree of sectoral 
targeting changed dramatically from the 1960s to the 1970s and then the 
1980s onward, Korea maintalned an outward-oriented, bottom-up, and 
integrated approach to industrial policy, relying on close public-private con-
sultation and international benchmarking. The government and the chaebol 
systematically studied what had to be done to fill the missing links in the 
domestic value chain and move up the quality ladder, through technology 
acquisition, human resource development1 and the construction of optimal-
scale plants aimed for the global market. As the capacity of the private sec-
tor increased and sectoral targeting became a more difficult proposition, 
Korea shifted to a more sector-neutral approach, which provided support for 
industry rationalization and R&D regardless of sectors. 
In "What's New in the New lndust1i'al Policy in Latin America? 11 Devlin 
and Moguillansky shift the focus of analysis to a region of the world where 
there has been a long history of government intervention. During much of 
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the period from 1950 to 1980 the general practice there was in line with the 
then mainstream thinking in development economics. Significant growth 
and some level of industrialization and modernization were recorded in 
many countries. However serious flaws in the design and execution of the 
industrial policy Jed to failure in caching up with advanced countries. The 
external debt crisis of the 1980s and the advent of Washington Consensus 
policies led to the dominance of the market paiadigm, with even Jess suc-
cess. ln recent years1 however1 there has been a renaissance of industrial 
policy in the region. The chapter highlights the nature of the shift to a more 
proactive state promotion of industrial and services upgrading, as well as 
the important new characteristics of industrial policy, which are different 
from those of the past and offer more hope of success. That same general 
argument is made by Kupfer, Ferraz, and Sllveira Maiques in "New Thinking 
on industrial Policy: Country Case Studies of Successful and Unsuccessful 
Industrial Policies." Focusing specifically on Brazil, they analyze three recent 
industrial policies enacted during the 2000s (the Industrial, Technological 
and Foreign Trade Policy, the Productive Development Policy, and the Brasll 
Maior Plan), and discuss their connections with the macro environment. 
These papers by economists from different backgrounds offer a diversity 
of perspectives on industrial policy. They are accompanied by enlightening 
comments and even some robust challenges by discussants (Ha-Joan Chang, 
josh Lerner, Pranab Bardhan, Celestin Monga, Ann Harrison, lndermit 
Gill, Robert Cull, Ariel Fiszbein, Shallid Yusuf, and Carlos Alvarez). Beyond 
the debates, there is a general recognition that successful economies have 
always relied on government policies that promote growth by accelerating 
structural transformation. The blind faith in the magic virtues of market 
forces in which rational agents would naturally create an optimal environ-
ment for growth and economic development has been disproved by the 
enormity of the Great Recession-and the swift policy responses that gov-
ernments around the world adopted to weather the crisis. Still, much work 
remains to be done to identify the specific policy levers and institutional 
frainework that can generate optimal industrial policy results in different 
contexts. This volume is a contribution to that important task. 
Notes 
1. President B, H. Obama, State of the Union Address, February 12, 2013. 
2. Prime Minister D. Cameron, Speech at the Confederation of British Industry)s Annual 
Conference, November 2012. 
3. The roundtable was organized jointly by the International Economic Association 
and the World Bank and held in Washington on May 22-23, 2012. 
4. See Cimoli, Dosi, and Stlglitz (2009); Griffith-Jones, Ocampo, and Stiglitz (2009); 
Lin (2012a, 2012b); Rodrik (2012); Rodrik and McMillan (2011). 
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5. The very definition of industrial policy has been source of debate and confusion. 
Two broad and competing conceptions can be found in the literature - and in 
this volume: the sector-specific one by the US international Trade Commission, 
according to which industrial policy involves 11 coordinated government action 
aimed at directing production resources to domestic producers in certain indus-
tries to help them become more competitive" (Tyson 1992); and the '1hol'izontal11 
approach popularized by the Lisbon Agenda of the EU states, for which "the 
main role of industrial policy [ ... ] is to proactively provide the right framework 
conditions for enterprise development and innovation in order to 1nake the EU 
an attractive place for industrial development and iob creation, taking account of 
the fact that most businesses are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)" (EC 
2007). The definition used in this introduction is closer to the former, though we 
consider industrial policy to be justified mainly for industries that are potentially 
competitive already. 
6. State of the Union Address, op. cit. 
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